OFF-LABEL USES OF APPROVED DRUGS A New Compromise is Needed by Pritchard, Robert H.
 




(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation OFF-LABEL USES OF APPROVED DRUGS A New
Compromise is Needed (1995 Third Year Paper)
Accessed February 19, 2015 9:32:04 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8965544
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-
of-use#LAAOFF-LABEL USES OF APPROVED DRUGS
A New Compromise is Needed
Robert H. Pritchard
Washington, D.C. is teeming with speculation regarding the likely eects of
a new political scenery and the Republican Contract With America. As the new
Congress is taking form and adjusting to a new reality, one voice stands out amid
the uproar... House Speaker Newt Gingrich has an agenda, and his intentions,
though not clearly spelled out, have certainly not been withheld from public
discourse. One of Mr. Gingrich's strongly voiced concerns centers on structure
of the FDA as it currently exists, and the eect that the entrenchment of bu-
reaucracy has on the functioning of this agency. Mr. Gingrich frequently cites
an example of a plunger-like cardiopulmonary resuscitation aid which, though
invented in the United States and proven tremendously eective in Europe, is
illegal and unavailable for use in this country.1
Mr. Gingrich's criticism of the FDA is not a new one. It is a
common complaint that FDA regulation follows the path of a pendulum: some-
times it is too lax, and other times it is much too strict. The current FDA, with
Commissioner David Kessler at its helm, is thought to be trapped in the latter
position.
An issue that has been debated without resolution for many years
centers on the topic of unapproved uses of drugs that have received FDA ap-
proval. Approval is required before a new drug can be marketed as such, and
1~. e ~ FDA Is it Too Poweipti?, Healthline. Dec. 12. 1994.
1is granted only upon submission of proof that a drug is safe and eective for
a specic use. Accordingly. any given drug is, technically, sanctioned only for
the use and dosage on which its safety and ecacy studies focused. In essence,
any change in use or dose from that studied in the clinical experimentation
could be said to require FDA approval. Fortunately, it has been recognized
that such a system would not only be unmanageable for the government, but
would signicantly undermine the eectiveness of medical practice. The primary
drawback of such a broad approval requirement, as routinely voiced throughout
the medical community, is that Ilorcing physicians to use drugs only for their
indications would... mean that people would die that didn't have to.2 Simply
stated, o-label drug uses are a medical necessity in a world where patients and
strains of diseases often vary only slightly from one another, such that estab-
lished treatments must be tailored to meet individual needs. Countering this
need for exibility, however, is the necessity of public protection from unsafe and
ineective drugs. For every piece of anecdotal evidence showing a death that
could have been avoided if a particular drug or instrument had been available,
there is a similarly compelling example of a situation in which a patient has
died needlessly at the hands of an ineective physician or method of treatment.
In attempting to balance these conicting interests, the FDA has
maintained a fairly consistent approach, endeavoring to ensure the availability
of needed drugs without sacricing high standards of safety. Unfortunately, the
FDA's own diculty in balancing these opposing concerns is reected in regu-
2Robert Goldberg. AARP Hands Members a Poison Pill. The Wall Street Journal. Au-
gust 16. 1994. (Citing Lawrence Norton of Memorial Sloan-Kettering.).
2latory inconsistency. While promotion of o-label uses is prohibited of manu-
facturers, physicians are generally free to engage in o-label prescribing. This
seeming compromise hides a dangerous reality by peririitting medical practice
to proceed without the benet of complete information.
This paper advocates elimination of this inconsistency from the
regulation of o-label uses of approved drugs. Following an exploration of the
statutory basis of FDA regulation of unapproved uses, it will be argued that the
FDA should limit its intervention into the practice of medicine. FDA regulation
in this area is unwise and infeasible; in addition, there are alternative mecha-
nisms that are already in place which, working in combination, can promote the
safety of medical treatment while preventing irrational delay in the marketing
of drugs and treatments which could improve the lives of millions of Americans
on a daily basis.
Statutory Authority to Control O-Label Promotion and Prescription
Two pair of provisions within the Federal Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act3 (the FDCA) are implicated in the analysis of the FDA's statutory
jurisdiction over unapproved uses of approved drugs. The rst, the New Drug
Provisions, arise from Section 30 1(d) of FDCA which provides that it is unlaw-
ful to introduce into commerce an article that is in violation of FDCA Section
505. Section 505, entitled New Drugs, establishes a requirement that any new
drug4 receive FDA approval as to its safety and eectiveness before it is entered
3 21 Usc x301. et. seq. (1972).
4 The term ~~new drug is dened in FDCA x201(p) as lalny ~g... the composition
of which is such that such drug is not generally recognized... as safe and eective for the use
under the conditions prescribed, recommended. or suggested in the labeling thereof
3into interstate commerce.
The second set of relevant provisions, the Misbranding Provisions,
involves Sections 30 1(k) and 502 of FDCA. Section 30 1(k) provides that it is
unlawful to undertake the... doing of any.., act with respect to a food [on ~ug...
if such act is done while such article is held for sale (whether or not the rst
sale) after shipment in interstate commerce and results in such article being...
misbranded. Section 502 provides the denition of misbranding in the context of
drug labeling, and two particular provisions are relevant to this analysis: Section
502(a) provides that a drug is misbranded if its labeling is false or misleading
in any particular; Section 502(0 stipulates that a drug is misbranded if it does
not bear adequate directions for use
Under the 1906 Food and Drugs Act, the FDA had jurisdiction over
misbranding and adulteration violations occurring at any stage of a drug's mar-
keting and distribution process. It was presumed by the FDA that this authority
was carried over into the 1938 FDCA5, which was more comprehensive and pro-
tectionist than its predecessor. Consequently, the FDA acted for many years on
the presumption that it had the right to bring actions against foods and drugs
which became adulterated or misbranded at any point prior to delivery to the
ultimate consumer. In 1947, however, the FDA was dealt a blow by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Phelps Dodge Mercantile Co., 157
5 See. e.g. Hearing on Seizure of Food and Drugs on HR. 3128, 80th Congress.
1st. Sess. at 3 (1947). (Reiterating that at the time of passage of the 1938 statute that ~It
was believed that the words ~while in interstate cornmer(~e were at least as inclusive as the
language of the old law [and thati ft/here is nothing in the extensive legislative history of
the new act that reveals anything but approval by the Congress and the regulated industries
of the long-standing practice of condemning goods which after interstate shipment became
adulterated.7)
4F.2d 453 (1946). In that case, a batch of pasta noodles became adulterated,
while waiting to be distributed for sale, more than two years after it had been
shipped in interstate commerce. When the FDA attempted to engage its powers
of seizure over the items, its jurisdiction over the spoiled food was challenged.
Relying on the FDCA as it appeared at the time, the court prevented the FDA
from asserting jurisdiction, holding that if an item was not adulterated or mis-
branded before or during interstate shipment, FDA jurisdiction was improper.
The immediate response to this apparent deciency in the FDCA
was the introduction and passage of the Miller Amendment, 62 Stat. 582 (1948).
The Amendment resulted in two changes in the FDCA: Section 30 1(k) was
amended to include the phrase ~~(whether or not the rst sale)6, which, along
with a similar addition to Section 304(a), had the eect of extending the mis-
branding and adulteration prohibitions for food and drugs to the time period
after interstate shipment. As a result, it is now unlawful for an action to be
taken which results in the misbranding or adulteration of a drug at any stage
of the item's marketing and distribution process, thereby reconciling the 1938
statute with statute that preceded it.
The Miller Amendment did not, however, provide the FDA with
complete jurisdiction over post-shipment drug activity. Section 30 1(d), invoking
the New Drug rules of FDCA Section 505, was not included in the Amendment.
Consequently, the FDCA does not prohibit a drug from being rendered a knew
6This provision now provides that adulteration or misbranding of a food or drug is action-
able if such adulteration or misbranding occurs ~~whiIe such article is held for sale (whether
or not the rst sale) after shipment in interstate commerce 21 USC x331(k) (1972) ((FDCA
x301(k) )).
5drug' after it has been shipped in interstate commerce, and then being sold
without pre-marketing FDA approval as is generally required. Instead, the
statute provides that if the Section 505 approval requirement has been met
for a drug in the form in which it is transported in interstate commerce. a
physician's subsequent prescribing activities should be held to neither reinvoke
Section 505 nor be constrained by the provision.
Throughout the history of the FDCA, two theories have been posed
in an attempt to create liability for a physician's o-label practices7. First, it has
been claimed that a doctor who prescribes drugs for o-label uses creates a new
drug that must obtain FDA approval before it can be marketed. A doctor's
prescription of a drug for an unapproved use creates a new drug8 which, if
introduced into interstate commerce, would ordinarily be subject to the FDCA
Section 505 approval requirement. Given current understanding of the Miller
Amendment's limited reach, however, it is now commonly held that this approval
requirement is not applicable where a doctor's prescribing activities occur after
a drug has completed its interstate distribution. If an approved new drug is
shipped in interstate commerce with the approved package insert, and neither
the shipper nor the recipient intends that it be used for an unapproved purpose,
the requirements of section 505 of the Act are satised.9 Consequently, attempts
7The existence and judicial acknowledgment of the following arguments shows that the
exact scope and implication of the Miller Amendment and o-label prescription activities
have been unclear at best for many years.
8Anything which currently required a new drug application such as a new product or new
use for an existing product which is not generally recognized as safe will in the future have
to make the test of eectiveness [x505 FDCAI laid down in the bill as amended. (Emphasis
added). S. Rep. No. 1744, 87th Cong.. 2d. Sess. (1962). (Discussion in relation to 1962
Amendments to Food. Drug. and Cosmetics Act.)
9Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs. 37 Fed. Reg. 16503 (1972).
6to hold physicians liable for o-label activities through reliance on Section 505
of the FDCA are consistently rejected on the basis of the FDCA itself.10
Attempts have also been made to establish physician liability through
reliance on the FDCA's misbranding prohibitions of Section 30 1(k). This pro-
vision is, as discussed above, applicable to any stage of a drug's distribution
process, and is not limited by the restricted scope of the Miller Amendment.
Section 502(f) requires that a drug bears... adequate directions for use.... Ac-
cordingly, it has been alleged, as in United States v. Evers, 643 F.2d 1043 (5th
Cir. 1981), that a doctor's o-label prescribing resulted in a drug's being mis-
branded since the label did not contain adequate directions for the use promoted
by the physician. In Evers, however, the court held that a doctor's o-label pre-
scribing does not constitute misbranding when the physician is promoting the
drug only to his own patients. The drug labeling provisions as set forth in the
Regulations accompanying the FDCA11 require that a drug's labeling provide
instructions for use that would be sucient and meaningful to a layman. For
prescription drugs12, however, the layman requirement has been eliminated since
prescription drugs are by denition presumed to contain elements unexplainable
and incomprehensible to an individual lacking medical expertise. Accordingly,
10One must note. however, that the language of the statute creates an exception to a
doctor's freedom to prescribe. If a physician were to prescribe a drug for an o-label use
to a patient who then purchased the drug in a new state or transported the drug to a new
state. the physician would be reintroducing the drug into interstate commerce, and would
theoretically be bound by the approval requirements of Section 505. In fact, however. I found
no authority supporting such a broad interpretation of the FDCA.
1121 C.F.R. x201.5. et. seq. (1994).
12The status of prescription drug is assigned to a product which because of its toxicity or
other potentiality for harmful eect, or the method of its use... is not safe for use except
under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drug... [and is
therefore] limited... to use under the professional supervision ofa practitioner licensed by law
to administer such drug 21 USCA x353(a) (1972).
7prescription drugs are not subject to Section 502(f)(1), and instead are required
to provide information sucient for a physician to understand the conditions
for proper use of the product.13 Consequently, as held the court in Evers, a
doctor providing drugs for o-label uses to his own patients owes a duty only
to himself, and is not to be held liable for labeling violations.14
In contrast, drug manufacturers are not granted as much freedom
with regard to unauthorized uses of the drugs that they produce. The law has
developed, consistent with the language of the statute, such that a manufacturer
is permitted to neither label nor promote a product for a use that has not
received FDA approval. Manufacturer liability is established in practice under
both the New Drug and the Mislabeling provisions.
Both provisions are called upon to prevent a manufacturer from
including unapproved uses of drugs on the labels and package inserts which
physically accompany drugs throughout interstate commerce. First, Section 505
provides that since a new drug is created upon inclusion of a new use on a drug's
label, FDA approval must be obtained before interstate shipment (since the
drug's 'newness' arises before interstate shipment, the limitation on the Miller
Airiendment has no eect here). Further, a manufacturer's label indicating
1321 C.F.R. x201.100(d)(1) (1994). ~ David. A. Kessler. Regulating the Prescribing of
Human Drugs for Nonapproved Uses under the Feed, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 15 Harvard
J. Legis. 693. 742. 747(1978): Ma~ee v. Wyeth Laboratories. 214 Cal.App. 2d 340. 350
(1963).
14Two unlikely exceptions to this x502 exemption are possible under the terms of the statute.
First, if a physician were to promote an o-label use of an approved drug to ocher physicians.
his actions would render the product misbranded since the label of the product would not
convey sucient information to explain the intended use to the recipient physician(s). In
addition, a doctor's promotion of over-the-counter drugs for o-label uses would render the
drugs misbranded, since the labeling would not suciently describe the intended use of the
product to the end user (over-the-counter drugs. unlike prescription drugs. are subject to the
layman requirements of x502(f).) I found, however, no cases which established liability for a
physician in either of these two situations.
8unapproved uses constitutes misbranding under FDCA Section 502(a)15. since
inclusion of such uses on the label falsely indicates FDA approval of the use. As
a result, a manufacturer is strictly prohibited from listing unapproved uses on
a drug's label.
Similarly, a manufacturer is not permitted to promote o-label uses
of a product beyond the connes of the label. The FDCA's misbranding pro-
hibitions apply not only to a product's label, but to all elements of a product's
labeling. Pursuant to FDCA Section 201(m), the labeling of a product includes
all written, printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any article or any of its con-
tainers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article. Much debate has arisen
over the appropriate inclusiveness of this term. In general, courts concur that a
product's labeling includes not only the indications axed to the product and
contained within the packaging in which the product is located, but also to all
written and oral statements which supplement or explain the axed literature.16
Consequently, the FDA has the authority to take action against a manufacturer
who describes o-label uses in any type of supplemental explanation provided
in connection with a consumer's purchase of a drug. As will be discussed later,
the FDA has greatly increased its powers in this area through an exceptionally
generous interpretation of labeling.
In sum, this extremely inclusive regulatory structure prevents a
manufacturer from promoting o-label uses of its drugs in any situation, and
15A drug is misbranded ifits labeling is false or misleading in any particular. 21 USC x351
(1972) ((FDCA x501(a) )).
16Kordel v. United States. 335 U.S. 345 (1948). See also United States v. Articles of Dru2'. 5906 Boxes,
745 F.2d 105. 114 (5th Cir. 1984).
9at any time, during a drug's distribution process. A physician, on the other
hand, is not prevented from prescribing approved drugs for o-label uses under
certain conditions.
FDA Implementation of its Statutory Authority
The FDCA, its accompanying Regulations, and related case law
provide the boundaries within which the FDA must operate in order to avoid
being charged with exceeding its statutory authority, per the Administrative
Procedure Act. Within these boundaries, however, the FDA is permitted to
exercise discretion in deciding how to implement the statute, and it cannot
be forced to take action merely to meet the letter of the statute.17 The FDA's
current policy regarding o-label uses of drugs provides that drug manufacturers
cannot promote o-label uses either directly, through labels and package inserts,
or indirectly through advertising and promotional activities. At the same time,
the FDA maintains a position, somewhat skeptically, that o-label prescribing
by doctors is permissible, since such activities are outside the jurisdiction of the
FDA.
The FDA's position on o-label prescribing activities of physicians
is embodied in a 1972 Proposed Rulemaking upon which formal action has never
been taken18. This document briey traces the statutory evaluation discussed
17Heckler v. Chanev, 470 U.S. 821. 831 (1985) ([A/ti agency's decision not to ... enforce
is a lecision ~'enc'rallv committed to an a~encv s absolute discretioti.)
18Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs: Prescribing for Uses Unap-
proved by the Food and Drug Administration. 37 Fed. Reg. 16503 (1972). The FDA recently
considered revoking this proposal after it had remained pending for nineteen years. but in the
end decided not to withdraw this proposed rule at this time. Instead, a task force has been
created to study o-label uses of prescription drugs, and the FDA has deferred further action
on the proposal until the task force has presented its ndings on this widespread practice.
Withdrawal of Certain Pre-1986 Proposed Rules. 56 Fed. Reg. 67440(1991).
10in the prior section of this analysis, and concludes by providing that toince the
new drug is in a local pharmacy after interstate shipment, the physician may,
as part of the practice of medicine, lawfully prescribe a dierent dosage for his
patient, or may otherwise vary the conditions of use from those approved in
the package insert, without informing or obtaining the approval of the Food
and Drug Administration. On somewhat shakier ground, the FDA concludes
its proposal with an assertion that liwihen an unapproved use of a new drug
may endanger patients or create a public health hazard, or provide a benet to
patients or to the public health, the Food and Drug Administration is obligated
to take one or more of the following courses of action...19, which actions include
requiring revision of the package insert and revocation of the drug's approval.
J~1 at 16504.
Although the FDA's primary reason for existence is protection of
the public from harms that may result from the marketing and prescribing of
adulterated foods and drugs, the powers of the FDA to fulll this role are not
unlimited. Despite the fact that safety statutes such as the FDCA are meant to
be interpreted liberally in order to further their safety goals, an agency cannot
pursue a statutory interpretation through which it exercises powers which have
not been delegated to it. Consequently, without statutory authority to do so.
the FDA has no right to utilize its powers to curb o-label prescriptions by
doctors merely because such uses become widespread or prove to be ineective.
19Similarly. current FDA Commissioner David Kessler is quoted as saying that he intends to
bring the full force of the law against anyone manufacturing. selling. shipping, or using drugs
in an o-label fashion. Robin M. Henig. FDA Assails O Label Uses of Cosmetic Drugs. The
Washington Post, June 18. 1991 at z7.
11Current FDCA Sections 301 and 505, as discussed above, limit the
power of the FDA to take action against a physician's o-label activities, and
make no distinction between o-label uses which are safe as contrasted with
those that are not. The legislative history of the FDCA further indicates that
the FDA was not meant to interfere in a physician's exercise of discretion in
determining how an approved drug is to be utilized in treating a particular
patient's ills, regardless of the success of the treatment. Remarking on the Act
as introduced to the Senate in 1934, the bill's sponsor, Senator
Copeland. stated without condition that this bill makes certain
that the medical practitioner shall not be interfered with in his practice.20 Sim-
ilarly, Senator Carroll, discussing the matter during Senatorial debate of the
1962 amendments to the FDCA, stated that I am not taking about regulating
medicine between the physician and the patient.21 In making such broad asser-
tions, the legislators acknowledged not only the status of a physician as a trained
professional with ethical responsibilities imposed by the medical profession, but
also the presence of medical malpractice and other forms of civil liability which
would suce to provide remedy where a doctor's prescribing actions brought
undue eects. Neither the statute nor its history indicates intent to condition
the FDA's hands-o policy upon the eventual success or failure of the innovative
treatment.
Indeed, in presenting the FDA's intention to take such bold regu-
latory action, the text of the proposal oers no justication or source of power
2078 Congressional Record 2728 (February 19. 1934).
21108 Cong. Record 17398 (August 23. 1962).
12under which the FDA might act. Further, there seems to be no clear statutory
authority for the FDA to take action pursuant to a physician's actions per s6.
Action may be warranted, though, if the eects of a physician's activities as
evaluated according to the New Drug provisions of FDCA Section 505 were to
be imputed to the man ujacturer.
A dening feature of a drug is intent.22 Following signicant de-
bate, the current consensus provides that the 'intent' underlying an item's status
as a drug is that of the manufacturer of a drug, and not that of the consumer
or prescribing physician.23 Similarly, a new drug is to be dened as a drug 'in-
tended by the manufacturer to be used as a drug' which has not been generally
recognized as safe, as dened in FDCA Section505.At one level, then, it appears
that signicant o-label use of a prescription drug is
- to - irrelevant in ascertaining whether an item is a drug, or a
new drug, as such use does not indicate manufacturer intent. Consequently,
a manufacturer is generally not to be held liable for marketing a new drug
without FDA approval merely because an approved drug is used by consumers
in an o-label manner.
There is, however, an exception to the 'manufacturer intent' re-
quirement, whereby consumer use may in fact be imputed to a manufacturer
and deemed manufacturer intent. In such a situation, it is theorized, a manufac-
22A drug is an article intended for use in the diagnosis. cure, mitigation. treatment, or
prevention of disease 21 USC 321(g)(l)(B) (1972) ((FDCA x201(g)(1)(B) )).
23~ ~ Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris. 655 F.2d 236. 239 (CA D.C. 1980) (State-
ments by petitioners and citations in the petition that cigarettes are used by smokers ... are
not evidence of such intent by the manufacturers or vendors of cigarettes, as tequmeci [under
FDCA x201(g)(I )(B)/ .. See ~ National Nutrition Foods Association v. Mathews. 557 F.2d
325.333 (2d Cir. 1977) (The vendors intc'nt in seIlin~ the prc)(Iuc't to the public is the key
element in this statutory detiitiotz.)
13turer's failure to act to prevent an unapproved use in the face of widespread o-
label use implies that the manufacturer intended for the use to continue without
limitation. The basis for the exception is articulated in Hanson v. United States,
417 F.Supp. 30, 35 (D.Minn. 1976), wherein the court stated that the 'intended
use' of a product... is determined from its label, accompanying labeling, promo-
tional claims, and any other relevant source. It has been held that consumer use
of a product can serve as a 'relevant source' in certain situations. The court in
National Nutritional Foods Association v. Mathews, supra n. 23. implied that
consumer use could substitute for objective manufacturer intent where the item
was used almost exclusively for therapeutic purposes. Mathews at 336. Simi-
larly, the court in Millet. Pit and Seed Company v. United States, 436 F.Supp.
84, 89 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) stated that the seller's knowledge of the consumers'
uses for his product is a factor to be considered [in evaluating all factors to
ascertain manufacturer intent],.., but we do not agree with the apparent theory
of the government that if any consumers use a product as a drug, such use, if
known by the seller, is determinative on this issue. These cases indicate that
although widespread consumer use can be imputed to a manufacturer as intent,
implied intent under this theory is to be found only in rare situations where
consumers... use the product predominantly and in fact nearly exclusively with
the appropriate intent.... Action on Smoking and Health, supra n. 23 at 240.
Therefore, although FDA jurisdiction may be justied in certain situations, it
is  o11 o clearly not so merely because an unapproved use of an approved new
drug becomes widespread....
14A related justication for manufacturer liability due to physician
or consumer usage arises by analogy to the tort concept of 'attractive nuisance'.
According to this theory, a party is deemed to have an armative obligation
to protect the inexperienced and those who lack maturity in judgment... from
injuries which were, under the circumstances, foreseeable.24 In its pure form,
the doctrine is applicable only to situations in which children are injured while
trespassing. Given the physical and psychological eects of severe illness, how-
ever, it could be asserted that like children, individuals facing a choice of death
or an unapproved use of a drug are incapable of making a mature decision with
respect to untested uses of approved drugs, thereby establishing a duty for the
irianufacturer to take steps to prevent o-label uses. If this proposition were
accepted, the FDA would be able to curb o-label uses merely by showing that
an o-label use was foreseeable, whereby a manufacturer's failure to take action
to prevent o-label drug use would be equated with intent to promote the o-
label use. Unlike the burden to be met in creating manufacturer liability given
widespread o-label use alone, a lower threshold of foreseeability under attrac-
tive nuisance theory would permit the existence of signicant unlabelled drug
use alone to carry signicant weight in imputing manufacturer intent through
consumer action.
The current scheme, whereby manufacturer intent is inferred from
consumer action in only a very narrow range of situations, may be thought to
severely limit the FDA's power to take action, but is crucial to a free market
24J.D. Lee & Barry Lindahl. 3 Modem Tort Law. 59 (1994).
15economy. Any time that a product is created, there is a signicant chance that
some people will use it in a manner not intended by the manufacturer. Similarly,
many products entail a measurable degree of risk in general use, so that the
number of likely injuries is statistically calculable. Just as a manufacturer is
not liable for its ability to calculate such statistics, it
- 12 - is imperative that a manufacturer not be held liable for 'cre-
ative' product applications except in the most extreme of circumstances. If
the status of an item as a drug or new drug were dependent on the actions
of consumers rather than the intent of the manufacturer, the intrusiveness of
the FDCA would become unbearable, and manufacturers would quickly nd
themselves unable to keep abreast of the burdens imposed by the statute. The
likely result would be eventual termination of the marketing of many products
that are valuable and essential in daily life. If consumer practices controlled an
item's status as a drug, manufacturers would be held accountable for the whims
and imaginations of a nation of consumers. By instead tying FDCA obliga-
tions to objective evidence of a manufacturer's intent, the statute provides a
manufacturer with a reasonable degree of control over its own fate.25
Consequently, although the FDA's stated intent, to take action
whenever an o-label drug use becomes widespread, could possibly be justied
under the FDA's existing powers, this is a policy that should not be pursued. In-
stead, the FDA should work to further its broadly stated policy of~~ interfering
with a doctor's prescribing activities.
25A manufacturer must still be aware, however, that such control is not complete. especially
given the FDA's current interpretation oflabeling which serves as evidence of a manufacturer's
intent.
16The FDA's current policy on manufacturer-induced o-label drug
use is also capsulized in the 1972 Proposed Rulemaking. In the text of the pro-
posed rule, the FDA cited the now-familiar statement that [i]f an approved new
drug is shipped in interstate commerce with the approved package insert, and
neither the shipper nor the recipient intends that it be used for an unapproved
purpose, the requirements of Section 505 of the Act are satised.26 In general,
the FDA has chosen to execute its powers regarding manufacturers and o-label
drug use with only minimal variation from the powers granted by the FDCA.
- 13 -
The FDA has, however, adopted two questionable interpretations
of the statute in order to increase its power over manufacturers. First, the
FDA utilizes FDCA Section 505 in a way that allows it to avoid the Miller
Amendment limitation, whereby it imposes manufacturer liability for actions
undertaken after interstate shipment has concluded. It is the FDA's position
that a manufacturer's initial compliance with Section 505 includes a binding
commitment through which the manufacturer has an ongoing obligation to abide
by the terms (and hence the listed uses) of the approved New Drug Application.
Deviation from the exclusive terms of the NDA, it is argued, constitutes a breach
of this obligation and a violation of Section 505. This is clearly a situation where
the FDA has expanded its powers beyond those provided through the statute
itself, as the FDCA clearly contemplates termination of FDA jurisdiction with
termination of interstate transport.
2637 Fed. Reg. at 16503.
17A second, and much more controversial, deviation from the FDCA
involves the FDA's current interpretation of labeling. As previously mentioned,
it is unlawful for a drug's 'labeling' to include information about unapproved
uses. By adopting an extremely liberal denition of this concept, the FDA has
signicantly increased its control over o-label drug usage. The FDA's inter-
pretation is statutorily justiable due to the vagueness of both FDCA Section
201(m)'s denition of labeling and the case law arising under that provision.
For the past several years, the FDA has regulated as labeling nearly any state-
ment by a manufacturer relating to an o-label use of a drug, regardless of the
credibility or truthfulness of the statement, and without consideration of the
promotional or descriptive nature of the announcement. The FDA has deemed
it illegal to include any information about o label uses even when such uses
dominate medical practice for the drug involved, are endorsed by respected
authorities. and are recommended by FDA sta themselves.27 Accordingly,
the FDA prohibits a manufacturer not only from notifying interested parties of
promising o-label drug uses,
- 14 - but also from distributing independent journal articles which
analyze particular o-label uses. In addition, the FDA's current denition of
'labeling' includes a manufacturer's provision of nancial support to a medical
symposium at which doctors discuss o-label uses of the manufacturer's prod-
ucts { even if the manufacturer had no indication in advance that its products
were to be discussed.28
27Stephen Chapman. FDA Censorship is a Real Danger to your Health.Chicago Tribune.
April 15. 1993. at P25. (Quoting' Professor John Calfre).
28Richard A. Samp. What the FDA Doesn't Want You to Know Could Kill You. Legal
18In one of its most hotly contested recent actions, the FDA seized
a medical textbook as misbranding of a drug product when the independent
text contained information about o-label uses of a manufacturer's drug.29 A
signicant problem with this form of FDA intrusion is its eect on the med-
ical industry and the science of medicine. Kim Pearson. publisher of the
Food and Drug Insider Report, has stated that [sleveral companies have aban-
doned plans to include the most up-to-date use information disclosed by medical
journals for fear that the FDA will restrict distribution of their texts in retal-
iation.30 The FDA's zealousness in attempting to prevent the distribution of
o-label uses of drugs has, unfortunately, resulted in a situation where indepen-
dent educational materials withhold valuable information from even medical
students. This is especially dangerous, as medical education can hope to be
eective only if there is freedom of discussion and exploration of ideas, both
traditional and novel, which is possible only if there is full access to all available
information. The FDA must be made to realize that its current intentions, while
justied in the short-term, have signicant long-term consequences that should
not be ignored.
This latest action has resulted in the ling of a lawsuit by the
Washington Legal Foundation.31 The lawsuit, naming Commissioner Kessler
Backgrounder. V.9 No.34. Oct. 7. 1994.
29James Bovard. Medical Follies at the FDA, Washington Times. Dec. 20. 1994. at A17.
(The text was The Chemntheranv Source Book, which the manufacturer was distributing tc)
doctors and practitioners ~LL~ L~A aunroval tc) do Sc)).
30Id.
31Washin2ton Legal Foundation v. David A. Kessler. C.A. No. 1:94 CVO 1306 (District
Court. District of Columbia 1994). At the current time. WLF has submitted its brief. and
rather than responding as required. Kessler and the FDA have issued a Request for Comments.
59 Fed. Reg. 59820 (1994).
19individually, alleges
- 15 - that the FDA's policy on educational and scientic activities32
interferes with First Amendment freedom of speech (both that of the manufac-
turer in distributing this information and that of patients and practitioners in
receiving the information), and that it unjustiably interferes with the eorts
of health care professionals to provide eective medical care. In defending itself
and its actions, the FDA has set forth examples of its exibility in permitting
certain types of educational and scientic information to be disbursed by the
FDA, reecting its desire to promote scientic ingenuity in situations lacking
elements of manufacturer promotion. Analysis of the FDA's policy, however, in
combination with a comparison of this policy and examples of its implementa-
tion, show that such a degree of discretion is aorded the FDA that justication,
accountability, and consistency, all of which are crucial to a workable program,
are not required of the FDA.
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the legal
background of the WLF case, it is evident that the current FDA policy on
manufacturer involvement in o-label uses is thought to be a compromise by the
FDA, balancing the needs of medical science for information and innovation with
the FDA's own statutory obligation to promote public safety and prevent harm
from unsafe or ineective drugs. Unfortunately, the compromise as currently
struck by the FDA, while nearly constituting an outright ban on o-label drug
use, is actually more dangerous than a complete ban would be, as it permits
32FDA Policy Statement. 57 Fed. Reg. 56412 (1992).
20o-label drug use to continue without the benet of full information.
Taking an aspirin every day, scientic studies have established, may
reduce your risk of heart attack and even cancer. I'm allowed to tell you that.
The American Heart Association is allowed to tell you that. Kermit the Frog
is allowed to tell you that. But one group isjorbidden to tell you that.' aspirin
makers.33 The irony in the current system is clear; a system that values a free
ow of information would insist that the manufacturer be the one party that
could distribute this information. Of all parties
- 16 - with an interest in the advocacy and utilization of o-label
uses of approved drugs, it is the drug manufacturers who have the most at
stake. Manufacturers whose products nd legitimate and eective alternate
uses have tremendous potential for additional gain, in the form of direct prots
and positive name connotation, both of which can be used to develop and market
additional products. Consequently, a manufacturer unfettered with regulatory
burdens would have tremendous incentive to support, develop, and analyze sci-
entic research relating to alternate uses of existing products. In addition, drug
manufacturers are most likely the only parties possessing the resources needed
to invest the time and money required to support industry inventiveness on a
regular basis. Once a manufacturer is forced to face FDA regulation unless it
ceases to provide funding for independent drug use research, support for the de-
velopment of such data falls solely to the eorts of various private and nonprot
scientic foundations. Though new uses can arise out of such organizations, a
33 Chapman. supra n. 27 (emphasis added).
21lack of funding and nancial stability greatly reduces the ecacy of such new
use development. Further, the manufacturer is the party in the best position
to gather and disseminate independently gathered information about o-label
uses of drugs; a single manufacturer can accumulate and distribute information
much more quickly and eciently than a number of distinct entities. Under
the current regime, however, the conditions under which a manufacturer can
undertake these activities are unclear at best. Faced with growing insecurity
and signicant likelihood of FDA intervention, manufacturers have quickly re-
treated from information production, collection, and dissemination activities,
and much available information no longer reaches practitioners and patients
who could most use and benet from the information.
Consequently, the FDA's current policy on o-label drug use is not
merely inconsistent, but is also quite dangerous.34 A corollary to the need for
doctors to employ o-label uses of therapeutic products is that they must be
able to learn which such uses are medically recognized ~ Under the current
regime, physicians are
- 17 - permitted to utilize drugs for unauthorized purposes, but
they do so under a signicant handicap: much of the information that could be
used to enhance the eectiveness of treatments, and perhaps even to motivate
a decision to not to use a particular o-label use in a specic situation, is being
censored and even seized by the agency that has a responsibility to assure that
drugs are not used in a manner outside of the best interests of the consuming
34The Gray Sheet. 20(25): 17-18. June 20. 1994.
22public.
The Benets of O-Label Prescribing Support an Exception to Pre-Market Approval
As evidenced by the FDA's inconsistency in regulating o-label uses of approved
drugs. experience has proven that o-label uses are often not only necessary, but
in many cases are extremely benecial.35 Even the FDA, while executing a mis-
sion to curb such uses of FDA approved drugs, has admitted that [u]nlabelled
uses may be appropriate and rational in certain circumstances, and may, in
fact reect approaches to drug therapy that have been extensively reported in
medical literature.... Valid new uses for drugs already on the market are often
rst discovered through serendipitous observations and therapeutic innovations,
subsequently conrmed by well-planned and executed clinical investigations.36
At the same time, however, it cannot be denied that serious harm can occur
when physicians and manufacturers abuse their bounded powers with regard to
o-label drug therapies.37 Given the substantial interests promoted by permit-
ted o-label drug uses, however, as well as the alternative safety incentives that
are already built into current legal and medical systems, the potential harms of
o-label use should not be called upon to justify the FDA's current policies.
- 18 -
It is important to note that the practice of o-label drug use need
35See, c'.g. Thomas Laetz & George Silberman.
Reimbursement Policies Constrain the Practice of OncoloQv. 266 JAMA 2996 (1991).
(Citing 1990 GAO survevshcnving that more than 33% of cancer drugs are used for o-label
purposes, with many such uses arising in situations where no alternate treatment would be
available).
3612 FDA Drug Bulletin 4 (1982).
37See. ~g.. Henig. Supra n. 19. (Discussing the recent debacle involving the use ofRetin-A
and other prc)ductsfc)r wrinKle oremovczl purposes).
23not be equated with back-alley tactics of unqualied and unethical physicians.
Nor should discussion of this topic evoke images of physicians' using ill patients
as human guinea pigs. In many situations, particular uses of drugs remain unla-
belled not because a use is unsafe or ineective. Instead, incentives owing from
the FDA and from the marketplace in general often encourage a manufacturer
to forego the process of receiving FDA approval for alternative uses of approved
drugs.
Since a new use of an approved drug creates a new drug within
FDCA Section 505, a manufacturer's instinctive desire to obtain approval for
all valid uses (and therefore be permitted to include such uses in labelling and
advertising) is oset by the reality of the FDA's New Drug Application (NDA)
process. Accordingly, studies and control testing must be undertaken so that
a manufacturer can provide the FDA with information sucient to justify an
expert opinion that the drug is safe and eective for each new use. Although
the FDA has, in recent years, acknowledged that the length and expense of its
approval process can serve as a disincentive to drug development, the agency s
steps to streamline and modernize the approval process have not proven over-
whelmingly signicant in reducing the burden that a manufacturer faces in seek-
ing FDA approval. As a result, it is not uncommon for a manufacturer to face a
nine-year process costing roughly $230 million to obtain approval of a new use
of an approved drug.38 The high cost of this approval process is somewhat sur-
prising since the drug itself has already been proven generally safe for human
38Bovard. Supra n. 29.
24consumption. One would imagine that the approval process for an alternate
use would involve an abbreviated process in which the sole issue would be that
of eectiveness of the drug for the additional use. More specically, it would
seem that approval cost and time would be signicantly reduced since the initial
phases of testing (Preclinical and Clinical, Phase I) would be identical to those
phases of testing of the drug itself. In fact, however, the
- 19 - impact of these savings is more than oset by the treatment
aorded an NDA for a new use. The FDA, faced with a backlog of applications,
gives signicantly higher priority to applications seeking approval of new drugs
than those seeking authorization of new uses of existing drugs. Consequently,
the time and mnoney involved in seeking approval of a new use are signicant,
and provide great disincentive for submission of alternate uses for FDA approval.
In addition to the mere nancial burden of FDA approval, manu-
facturers often face another source of disincentive: insucient market demand.
In many instances, the alternative uses of a drug, discovered through a doc-
tor's attempts to nd treatment for a specic patient's disease, are extremely
useful in only a small number of cases. In such situations, the mnanufacturer
cannot economically justify pursuing the steps required for FDA approval. If
the market for a drug's use is not large enough to provide the manufacturer
with a reasonable return on the expenditure required to obtain approval, the
use, though potentially invaluable and unmatched in eectiveness, will not be
brought forward for FDA approval.
One example of this disincentive is pediatric drugs, and more specif-
25ically cancer drugs for children. When a drug receives FDA approval, it is gen-
erally approved only for use in adults. For the drug to be labeled for use in
children, an NDA would have to be submitted with data establishing safety
and eectiveness resulting from clinical studies using children as participants39.
The burden of such studies is not insignicant (up to $30,000 per child)40, and
manufacturers are aware that there is insucient market demand for these drug
uses to justify the expenditure that would be required for FDA
- 20 - consent. Consequently, many pediatric treatments depend
completely on o-label uses of adult-approved drugs.41
In addition, manufacturers often face a free rider problem when de-
ciding whether to obtain FDA approval for additional uses of approved drugs,
and this as well provides disincentive to a manufacturer considering submission
of a new use NDA. For common over-the-counter drugs and drugs whose use
patents have expired, a manufacturer has virtually no incentive to get a new
drug use approved, regardless of the size of the potential new market. The
nature of FDA proprietary rights is such that in these situations, a manufac-
turer who pursues new use authorization will have no legal authority to prevent
competitors from capitalizing on the approved new use. Consequently, a manu-
39The FDA is. fortunately, currently considering taking action to relieve this burden
by waiving the requirement for separate testing of children in situations where the man-
ufacturer is able to use other methods to prove that the drugs are safe and eective for
use in children (e.g. chemical analysis accompanied with proof that the eect in children
would not be dierent from the already-approved eect of the drug on adults). Charles G.
Moertel. O-Label DruQ Use for Cancer Therapy and National Health Care Priorities, 266
JAMA 3031(1991). citing 57 Fed. Reg. 47427 (1992).
40Bovard. Supia n. 29.
41If I didn't prescribe o-label. my ability to treat children eectively would be severely
limited. (Statement ofDr. Mark Riddle, Director of child and adolescent psychiatry at Johns
Hopkins University). Malcolm Ritter. Ouestions Urged on Desinramine, Los Angeles Times.
February 20. 1994. at Al.
26facturer would likely nd his reward for the tremendous expenditure for securing
FDA approval being a new market with competitors who are able to charge less
for the same product. Although the single manufacturer would presumably ob-
tain a use patent for the new use, any promotion of this product would benet
existing substitute products known to be equivalent, while the manufacturers of
the substitutes would have invested no time or money seeking FDA approval.
This, not ineectiveness or lack of safety. is a signicant reason that aspirin,
widely supported as an anti-blood coagulant, has not been proposed for FDA
approval as such.42
Even in situations where FDA approval has not been sought be-
cause of insucient testing and knowledge to support an NDA, o-label drug
use must still be permitted in appropriate circumstances. Some have sarcasti-
cally asserted that the arguments supporting permitted o-label drug use could
be extended, ad absurdum, to the proposition that the FDA should refrain from
interfering in a doctor's practice of
-21 - medicine altogether, and that doctors should therefore be
permitted to execute medical therapies utilizing drugs which have received no
FDA approval whatsoever. This is not a legitimate extension, however, and the
distinction between these situations provides support for bounded approval of
o-label drug usage. In order for o-label use of a drug to even be considered, the
42The drug companies that manufacture aspirin aren't going to spend the money to sub-
stantiate [the anti-blood coagulant] claims because if. for instance. Bayer substantiates
a claim. St. Joseph's can put it on their label and share the benet without having
shared the cost of research. Debra Carr-Elsing, Aspirin A Day Might Keeo Illness at Bay,
The Capital Times. June 8. 1993 at ID. (Quoting Robert Persk~'. author, ~wi~
Wonder Dru~ What the Label on Your Aspirin Bottle Doesn't Tell You.).
27drug itself must have already been subjected to the rigors and analysis accom-
panying a new drug NDA. Through this process, it will have been determined
that the drug itself is tolerable to the human anatomy. Further, successful mar-
keting of the drug ensures, as studies alone cannot, that the drug is in fact safe
for human consumption. Consequently. aside from the ever-present risk that
a specic patient's condition will cause an adverse reaction, the primary risk
involved in o-label drug use is that the drug will not be eective for treating
the condition to which it is being applied. This is very dierent from a situation
in which an unapproved drug is introduced to the general populous, as in such
a case, basic safety cannot even be assessed. As will be discussed, a compromise
between a comriplete o-label ban and free o-label use can be structured in
order to signicantly reduce the risk of drug ineectiveness in the case of un-
approved uses of approved drugs while maintaining the highest possible level of
safety assurance.
It is commonly recognized that no drug is safe. Part of the intrigue
of drug safety and eectiveness stems from the fact that it is often the dosage of a
drug that determines its overall usefulness. When a physician decides whether
to prescribe a particular drug for a specic condition, much of the ultimate
decision rests on the outcome of a cost-benet analysis. Similarly, the FDA's
new drug application process reects the FDA's need for information so that it
can properly perform a cost-benet analysis in determining whether or not to
approve a drug for general marketing.43 In a situation where a manufacturer is
43Drug Safety: Hearings Befare a Subcommittee cJf House Committee c)Pi Government
Operations. 88th Cong.. 2d Sess. (1964).
28seeking approval of a new drug, it is appropriate that
- 22 - the FDA perform the cost-benet analysis. The FDA, uti-
lizing the information required of the manufacturer, is suciently equipped to
carry out this analysis. Although the FDA's decisions are often ineciently con-
servative, it is appropriate that the FDA, the party with ultimate responsibility
for public safety, serve as the nal barrier to widespread consumer marketing of
a new product.
Conversely, in a situation where a doctor is considering employ-
ing the use of an FDA-approved drug for an unapproved purpose, it is more
appropriate for the physician to perform this analysis. In contrast to a situa-
tion involving pending release of a drug for wide-scale public consumrmption,
o-label drug use typically originates under a single working doctor/patient re-
lationship. Such a relationship assures that the drug is being prescribed for a
particular reason and that there will likely be close individual monitoring of the
aected patient during the period of drug ingestion.
In addition, the analysis underlying an o-label drug use, unlike
that for initial approval of a new drug, typically occurs once market evidence
is available as to the safety and ecacy of the drug. The FDA's requirement
of control studies is presumably based on the need for comprehensive, reliable
information in a situation where evidence from actual application of a product
is not available. It seems that this requirement has, however, taken on a life
of its own, whereby the notion of control study is given much more signicance
in the regulatory scheme than it merits. A doctor who is weighing treatment
29alternatives in the face of established scientic and anecdotal evidence compiled
during public use of a product should be encouraged, not constrained, as it is
this type of information, rather than solely clinical evidence compiled under
contrived circumstances, that indicates the true safety and eectiveness of a
drug.44
In a situation involving an individual treatment decision rather
than general approval of a new drug item, a more accurate cost-benet conclu-
sion will be
- 23 - reached if the doctor rather than the FDA performs the eval-
uation. The conservativeness of the FDA, problematic in a new drug decision,
becomes unbearable in a situation involving o-label drug use in a particular in-
stance. As an agency of the federal government charged with promoting public
safety, the FDA has incentive to be extremely conservative, denying every appli-
cation for which denial would not be patently unjust. The FDA is aware that if
it approves a drug which turns out to be unsafe, it will face procedural hurdles
under FDCA Section 505(e) in order to withdraw its approval of the item.45
Faced with the possibility of such an expensive and time consuming process, it
is not surprising that the FDA is extremely cautious in granting approvals in
the rst place. The problem of revocation of approval is exacerbated by the
fact that a physician is not required to notify the FDA of adverse reactions
44In fact, the early period following general marketing of a new drug must be regarded as
a nal step in the testing of the product. There is no way to duplicate fully in clinical trials
the great variety of use conditions under which a new drug will be employed when it is nally
approved.... Id.
45Section 505(e) requires notice and hearing before a drug's approval may be withdrawn.
An exception is created whereby in cases of 'imminent hazard to public health an item may be
de-classied immediately. but even this requires that the FDA pursue post-revocation process
in order to uphold the constitutional rights of the manufacturer.
30arising from the use of prescribed drugs.46 Accoi'dingly, the FDA has a legiti-
mate concern that it will not learn of such problems quickly enough to respond
in an ecient manner, whereby the FDA's initial failure to prevent an unsafe
drug fromn being marketed would be magnied while the FDA was unaware
of existing problems. In addition, as a political creature, the FDA is properly
concerned about the political fallout that it will face if it approves a drug which
turns out to be unsafe or ineective. Finally, much of the FDA's eectiveness
depends on voluntary cooperation of the parties within its jurisdiction.47 Con-
sequently, the FDA is hesitant to risk loss of public approval by permitting the
marketing of a drug which ultimately harms the consumers whom the FDA is
obligated to protect. At the other extreme, however, an FDA denial of approval
will, at most, prevent a helpful drug from entering the market. FDA account-
ability for such action is likely minimal, since the tremendous power of the FDA
discourages manufacturers from challenging the decisions
- 24 - of the agency. Further, if its decision is challenged. the FDA
is able to maintain public favor by calling upon the strict requirements of the
FDCA and arguing that they were not met. As a result, one estimate describes
the outcome of FDA decisionmaking as such that approximately four thousand
NDA's are rejected for every one that is approved.48 Although it is likely that
not all of these applications identied adequately supported drugs, it is similarly
4637 Fed. Reg. 16503. Supra n. 18.
47Although the FDA is provided with enforcement mechanisms, the realities of FDA funding
and stang are such that if the FDA were required to bring formal action in every instance
of regulation. the backlog and expense would be unmanageable.
48Abel Torres. The Use of FDA-Anproved Medications for O Label Uses. Archives of
Dermatology. p. 32(1994).
31implausible that all were invalid.
A doctor making a decision of whether or not to undertake a par-
ticular o-label use in the course of treatment of an individual patient is not
exposed to these same external pressures. Pursuant to the Hippocratic Oath, a
physician has an obligation to provide medical therapy solely for the good of [the
physician's] patients according to [the physician'sI ability and [the physician's]
judgment.49 Similarly, the World Medical Association's Declaration of Helsinki
Code of Ethics provides that a physician is obligated to consider only the inter-
ests of the patient, and is to use a new therapeutic measure, if in his judgment
it oers hope of saving life, reestablishing health, or alleviating suering.50 A
physician, therefore, has strong incentive to not discount the potential benets
of a treatment when carrying out a cost-benet analysis.
In contrast to the FDA's decision to approve a new use for a drug,
a physician's o-label prescribing does not invoke instantaneous, widespread
acceptance of such use. Consequently, the threat faced by the FDA of immedi-
ate human carnage is not a necessary element of a physician's decision process.
Further, a physician has an obligation to monitor the progress of his patient,
and therefore has the power to prevent the breakdown in communication that
is possible following FDA approval of a drug. Finally, a physician who be-
comes aware of an adverse reaction has the power to immediately terminate the
patient's ingestion of the harmful product, so delay costs need
49Dorland's Medical Dictionary. 27th Edition, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Inc.. p. 768
(1988).
50T.L. Beauchamp and J.E. Childress. ~nciples of Biomedical Ethics 60 (1983).
32- 25 - not be considered by the doctor. In the end, it is likely that a
physician's particular prescribing practices constitute an area of drug approval
in which it is wholly appropriate, and indeed the superior alternative, for the
physician to conduct the cost-benet analysis.
Benets of Availability of O-Label Uses
The practice of o-label prescribing itself has notable benets. In
some situations, an o-label prescription is the only treatment available to a
patient, either because a more targeted drug is does not exist, or because other
methods of treatment are ineective or unavailable due to patient intolerance.
In these situations, o-label uses of drugs provide the only chance of restored
health.
O-label prescription activities also have benets which extend be-
yond merely bringing relief to an individual patient in a single situation. History
is replete with examples of signicant medical advances that have arisen from
happenstance, or because of a well-conceived theory that was pursued by an en-
thusiastic physician or scientist. If such ingenuity is to continue, o-label uses
must be permitted. Drug manufacturers will always have incentive to investi-
gate, and physicians will have incentive to demand, radical new drugs involving
cutting-edge technology and intensive research. Manufacturers know that such
drugs, which permit them to create and service entirely new markets, provide
immrteasurable benets to corporate well being. At the same time, however,
it is important to recognize that one need not, and often cannot, reinvent the
wheel in order to treat each individual patient. This is the role that triust be
33lled by o-label drug uses.
If mnanufacturers know that they will be unable to promote new
uses for drugs without FDA approval, and that FDA approval is infeasible given
the nature of the drug or the size of the market, they will have no incentive to
pursue alternative uses for existing drugs. Similarly, if a physician knows that
altering a prescription from the
- 26 - package insert of a drug will bring interference from the FDA,
there will be little incentive to utilize knowledge and accumulated expertise
in order to provide tailored treatments to individual patients. Under such a
regime, a physician would ll the role of an over-qualied pharmacist by merely
matching symptoms with drugs, and then prescribing medicines according to
the written instructions provided by the manufacturer. The cost of this system
in terms of human lives would be incredible. In cancer treatment alone, fty-
six percent of aected patients receive at least one o-label drug,51 while for
stomach cancer in particular, more than sixty percent of current treatment is
o-label52. In many situations, these inventive uses and combinations of drugs
are the only hope for current treatment and future developt'nent of even more
eective medical remedies.
FDA Intervention is Impractical
FDA regulation of o-label drug use would not only be improper;
it would also be imnpractical. The FDA currently suers from a problem that
51Lou Fintor. Reimbursement Inuence Choice of Cancer Therapy, 83 Journal of the Na-
tional Cancer Institute 1606 (1991).
52Thomas Laetz & George Silberman. Reimbursement Policies Constrain the Practice of Oncolo~v.
266 JAMA 2997 (1991).
34is common among governmental entities: there is much too much work for
the number of people and current budget of the agency. Resources are al-
ready strained, undermining the eectiveness of the FDA. Narrowed jurisdic-
tion and/or an increase in the agency's budget would permit the agency to
suciently focus on important individual issues rather than having to provide
minimal coverage to a wide range of activities. Consequently, it is somewhat
perplexing to observe the FDA's determination to increase its jurisdiction over
physicians and their o-label practices. If the FDA were to nalize the rule
that would permit intrusion whenever an o-label use became 'widespread', the
regulatory jurisdiction of the agency would immediately increase by more than
650,000 individuals.53 It is
- 27 - unlikely that this additional burden could be carried in any
meaningful way by the current
FDA.
FDA Interference is Unnecessary
FDA jurisdiction over o-label drug uses would needlessly interfere
with an existing incentive system which has tremendous potential to prevent
abuses of such drug uses. Medical malpractice and medical industry self-policing
can, in combination, prevent many potential abuses present when physicians
are permitted to exercise discretion in selecting patient treatments. Addition of
FDA regulation is not only unnecessary, but constitutes a waste of resources,
since the enforcement powers of the FDA are inferior to those already existing
53As of 1992. there were approximately 653.100 physicians practicing in the United States.
Statistical Abstract of the United States. United States Department of Commerce. 121
(1994).
35under these alternative regulatory schemes.
The FDA possesses four primary tools for enforcing the FDCA:
injunction proceedings (FDCA Section 302), criminal penalties (FDCA Section
303), seizures (FDCA Section 304), and revocation of FDA approval of drugs
(FDCA Section 505(e)). Although these remedies provide the FDA with ad-
equate power to control abuses in many situations, they are not sucient to
permit eective regulation of o-label drug use.
FDA revocation of a drug's approval is the ultimate power that
the FDA possesses, and carries perhaps the best deterrence available. It is,
however, simply not a suitable remedy for dealing with o-label uses of drugs.
As previously mentioned, the procedural hurdles that the FDA faces in pursuing
this remedy render it signicantly burdensome. In addition, revocation of a
drug's approval would prevent the drug from being available for not only o-
label uses, but also for the uses for which the drug has been proven safe and
eective. Such action would likely result in signicant public uproar and would
inict tremendous injury on the public, and hence is not ordinarily a viable
remedy.
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Similarly, criminal penalties against manufacturers and individuals
(both physicians and corporate executives) serve as a tremendous deterrent to
aberrant behavior, as they implicate two fundamental interests: nancial well-
being and personal freedom. Indeed, many cynics assert that the possibility
of a jail sentence is the only truly eective weapon that the FDA possesses.
36Although criminal nes may eectively further the interests of the FDA, the
option of imprisonment is rendered infeasible by the current mnagnitude of o-
label prescribing. It has been estimated that roughly 400 million of the annual
1.6 billion prescriptions issued by doctors in the United States are for o-label
uses).54 It is neither possible nor reasonable to imprison all of the individual
doctors who are engaging in this practice given the extent of existing and feasible
jail facilities in the country.
Injunctions and seizures are similarly impractical as mechanisms
for FDA control over o-label uses of drugs. The degree of FDA intrusion
that would be required to issue and enforce an injunction against individual
physicians' o-label prescribing practices would be intolerable. Further, the
necessarily constant and continual monitoring of physicians' activities would
undoubtedly stretch the resources of the FDA beyond a feasible level. Even
more devastating consequences would attach to FDA attempts to control o-
label drug uses through seizures. Under such a plan, the FDA would not only
be required to monitor individual physicians, but also to pursue discovered
violations by contacting individual patients and conscating the actual bottles
of drugs. Such action would clearly be overwhelming for the FDA and would
prevent it from pursuing its legitimate objectives.
Medical malpractice as it already exists is a mnajor source of de-
terrence against abusive o-label drug prescription. This remedy is available
to patients harmed by a physician's imrtproper activities, parties with tremen-
54MAlt Freudenheim. Creative Drug Use Gets FDA Scrutiny, Miami Herald. June 30.
1991. at 6A.
37dous incentive to monitor the appropriateness of their physicians' prescribing
practices. Unlike criminal nes provided
- 29 - for under the FDCA, a tnalpractice judgment is determined
solely through analysis of the situation in which the activity took place and
through which the injury arose, and not through a pre-determined formula. This
lack of predictability, combined with the sheer magnitude of judgment likely in a
malpractice award, provides much more incentive against physician impropriety
than could criminal penalties. Though a malpractice award serves only as an
ex-post remedy in any individual case, the threat of such suits (where settle-
ments commonly occur at amounts in excess of $1 million) provides tremendous
incentive for a physician to avoid the possibility of such a suit by carefully an-
alyzing a treatment situation and assuring himself that a selected treatment is
appropriate and justied.
The current standard for mriedical malpractice due to a physician's
deviation from a drug's labeling provides that although such activity is not per
s~ negligence, evidence of the departure from the recommended use can be
admitted as evidence of imrtpropriety.55 Though the exact use to which such
evidence can be put diers among jurisdictions56, a physician is assured that
under the current system, he will be given the opportunity to present a jury
with the information that was used in assessing the treatment alternatives for
the patient. The physician will therefore have the opportunity to justify himself
55Peter B. Hutt and Richard A. Merrill. Food & Dru~i Law 630(1991).
56See. e.g. Sal~o v. Leland Stanford Jr. Bd. of Trustees. 317 P.2d 170 (CA 1957) (label-
ing constitutes evidence of appropriate standard of care. but not conclusively.) Contra
Mulder v. Parke Davis, 181 N.W.2d 882 (MN 1970) (physician package insert constitutes
prima facie evidence of standard of care.)
38and his decision to depart from the indications for use approved by the FDA
and listed by the drug's manufacturer.
It is noteworthy that despite the likelihood of facing a medical
malpractice lawsuit, physicians prefer the current system of regulation, with
the opportunity to determine patient treatment methods and then justify such
a decision to a jury. Even though juries are likely to favor a plainti and are
inclined to award a huge sum of money to a stricken patient, one practitioner,
undoubtedly aware of the potential liability posed by the current regulatory
scheme, indicates that he would prefer to take his chances and
- 30 - have the opportunity to utilize o-label treatments and then
justify his actions, saying I would rather have the FDA withdraw a drug from
the market for adverse eects than have the FDA limit how the drug can be
prescribed....Otherwise the FDA would be involved in actually regulating the
in-oce practice of medicine by the individual physician. And frankly, I don't
trust the govemment to do that.57
Another element undermining the argument that FDA involvement
in regulating o-label drug usage is required is the strong communication system
that exists among practicing physicians. As evidenced by the prevalence of o-
label practices promoted by unsponsored intra-professional communication, the
medical community is tightly bound by communication networks, made up in
part by numerous journals, periodicals, and associations. Running through this
structure seems to be a strong policing power instituted by the industry itself,
57Henig. Supra n. 19. (Quoting George Lundberg, editor c)f~.).
39evidencing eorts by individual practitioners to join forces in order to promote
the interests of the medical industry through accurate and ecient dissemination
of information. At the same time that doctors are notifying others of discoveries
and breakthroughs that have been found, t'nedical literature reects a parallel
concern to provide notice of problems that have arisen as experience is gained
with new drugs and new treatments.
It is widely recognized that members of an industry benet individ-
ually when the industry as a whole is viewed favorably by the clientele that it
serves. In many situations, however, economic and mnarket incentives provide
mnotivation for selsh actions which promote individual rather than collective
interests. Although the nature of the medical industry does not fully promote
collectivist goals, the reality of current conditions assures that physicians have
incentive to work together in order to maintain the integrity of, and encour-
age condence in, the medical industry. Public sentiment is, like never before.
putting the medical industry as it has been known for many years into senous
jeopardy. This has been equated of late into several signicant political
-31- recommendations which aim to radically and irreversibly alter
the practice of medicine in the United States. Consequently, physicians know
that every action that they take is likely to be strictly scrutinized, so that
there is tremendous incentive to disburse information, including that of adverse
reactions to popular o-label uses.
There is evidence that such self policing of physician activities took
place even before the medical industry came under re. The case of the drug
40'desipramine' serves as a good example of eective industry self-regulation. De-
sipramine is a drug which was approved for use in adults for the treatment of
depression and similar psychiatric conditions. In the 1970's, the drug gained
widespread acceptance for o-label treatment of adolescent hyperactivity and
depression. After this use had gained acceptance. it was discovered that the
long-term eects of the drug on children were unfavorable, even fatal. Within
a relatively short period of time, the same communication network that had
promoted the acceptance of desipramine use in children had been utilized to
warn doctors not to use the drug in children, and the incidence of this practice
has been greatly reduced.58
Freedom of Choice
One element that separates humans from animals is that humans
have been granted the ability to think and reason, and are able to gather in-
formation and analyze it in order to form rational decisions. Wars have been
fought over the importance of freedoms such as the liberty to choose one's des-
tiny. In reality, however, no freedom is more important or fundamental than
the ability to choose between life and death. FDA intervention in o-label drug
use takes this choice away from many individuals, and as such should not be
tolerated.
The purpose of the FDA, it is repeatedly said, is to protect the
ignorant, the unthinking, the credulous. In most situations, this is a crucial role
that must be lled,
58Ritter. Supra n. 41.
41- 32 - protecting the lives and health of countless American citizens.
In certain circumstances, however, it is crucial that the FDA back away from
its strict watchdog position, and permit ill patients to work with their doctors
in order to implement medical treatments that have not, for any of the several
reasons cited above, received the FDA's stamp of approval.
It is beyond doubt that there is patent cruelty in a doctor's pro-
viding false hope to a dying patient in the form of an ineective new drug or
treatment. Conversely, however, it seems equally, if not more, reprehensible for
the government (through the FDA) to deny a dying patient the right to even a
chance of life merely because it has set up a system in which drug manufacturers
have no incentive to seek approval for new uses of approved drugs. Further, a
doctor has an ethical duty to work solely to extend the life of his patient, and
realistically has no incentive to maliciously taunt a patient with hollow possi-
bilities of restored health. Medical malpractice, as discussed above, deters a
physician from engaging in such behavior by punishing not only the act itself,
but also the marginal trauma resulting from delays in seeking other, possibly
eective, legitimate treatments.59
Compromise is Available
It is imprecise to evaluate the situation of o-label drug activities
as having solely two extreme poles: oensive FDA intervention at one end, and
chaotic quackery with runaway physician discretion at the other. Instead, there
59e.g. George v Kaiser Foundation Healthgroup, Case No. L79507 (11-1-88) (Patient
awarded $775,0~ to co,npensate for reduction in chances of survival due to doctor's delay
in diagnosing).
42is a compromise that can (and should) be struck between these two positions.
Among the various sources of communication that bind the medical industry
are various medical compendia. These are medical texts created by associations
within the medical industry, providing detailed information for physicians on
the approved drugs that are on the market at any given
- 33 - time. Unlike the Physician's Desk Reference60, these com-
pendia list not only the approved uses of these approved drugs, but they also
refer to o-label drug uses that have support in the medical industry. The ra-
tionale for listing such uses is set forth in the Preface to the American Medical
Association's Drug Evaluations, one such compendium:
Because indications approved for labeling by the FDA may lag be-
hind both the world literature and medical practice or because the manufacturer
has not submitted an application for a new use, this book comments on uses of
drugs regardless of their status in ocial labeling.
The reliance on such anecdotal and marketplace scientic infor-
mation that is reected in these widely used medical texts indicates the value
placed by physicians on this type of experience data. The fact that physicians
use these sources on a daily basis in constructing patient treatments satisfying
their professional and ethical obligations suggests that FDA approval is not,
in the end, the sole indicator of a drug's safety and eectiveness. There is,
moreover, additional evidence that this information is extremely valuable and
reliable. In January of 1994, Medicare began paying for certain treatments
60Fran Kritz. FDA Seeks to Add Drugs' New Uses to Labels, Washington Post. March 29.
1944 at zI 1.
43of cancer utilizing o-label treatments involving oral cancer drugs.61 In order
to qualify for coverage, however, the treatment must be one which appears in
any one of the three authoritative medical compendia... the American Hospital
Formulary Service, the United States Pharmacopoeia Drug Information, or the
American Medical Association Drug Evaluations.62 It is clear from this policy
that the United States Congress concurs in the judgment that these medical
sources m'nerit signicant reliance.
The most encouraging evidence suggesting that reliance on this
type of information is legitimate is that the FDA itself, in discussing insurance
coverage of o-label treatments with private insurance companies, has encour-
aged the companies to look beyond the labeling of a drug. Indeed, Dr. Stuart
Nightingale, Associate Commissioner
- 34 - for FDA Health Aairs, encouraged private insurers to rely
on market data and compilations of experiential data from sources such as med-
ical compendia, urging that [a]n FDA label is not meant to be the arbiter of
appropriate treatment.63 As a result, the current model legislation for state
laws relating to insurance coverage of o-label drug uses provides that insur-
ance policies that pay for medication must pay for o-label treatments if the
drug in question is recognized for that indication in one of the three standard
references 64
61F. Rep. No. 403. 103rd. Cong.. 2d Sess. (1994).
62Id.
63Tim Friend, Best Cancer Drugs Often Not Covered, USA Today. June 29. 1989 at lA.
Contra Fran Kritz, Supra n. 60. (Citing Commissioner Kessler, The labels really are the best
scienqc knowledge of how a drug can be safely used.)
64Kate Nagy, States Aim Laws at O-Label Reimbursement, 85 Journal of National Cancer
Institute 701 (1993). (Citing policy set forth by Association of Community Cancer Centers).
44Given the signicance of this information among members of the
FDA, Congress, and practitioners within both the medical and insurance indus-
tries, it seems incomprehensible that the FDA has consistently refused to fully
acknowledge the validity of these alternative sources of medical authority. The
FDA recognizes the validity of this information when passing judgment on it
indirectly, but refuses to apply the same reasoning when its own policies and ob-
jectives are under consideration. If the FDA were to fully embrace these sources
of data, it could use this information (which is cost-free to the agency) in order
to bring consistency to its regulation of o-label practices by permitting pro-
motion of appropriate o-label activities while at the same time not forsaking
its obligations to promote public safety and health.
In analyzing the current status of FDA regulation of this issue,
the medical and pharmaceutical industries have recognized that there are two
conicting interests at stake in the regulation of o-label drug use: the desire to
attain the benets that would be available in a system pen'nitting the free ow
of information pertaining to legitimate o-label uses of FDA-approved drugs,
and FDA's obligation to fulll its role as monitor and provider of public safety.
In accommodating these interests in a workable format, it has been suggested
that the FDA might permit a labeling practice in which a drug
- 35 - manufacturer would be permitted to disclose o-label uses
of a drug, provided that the uses were listed in one of the authoritative medi-
cal compendia and were supported by substantial high-quality evidence.65 If it
65e.g. O-Label Drug Use. The Pink Sheet, 54(22). October 29. 1990. (Citing Peter
Bewley, Assoc'i ate General Counsel, Johnson and Johnson Company).
45were to permit this type of labeling, the FDA would be assured that the only
information disseminated would be that pertaining to valid, legitimnate, and
scientically supported uses of drugs. In addition, the inclusion of this infor-
mation on the labeling of the product would give the FDA complete control
over the content and format of the information, under the FDCA's prohibitions
against misbranding of drugs found in FDCA Section 502. Permitting labeling
of this type allows high-quality information about valuable medical treatment
to be received by those who are most likely to benet from the knowledge. At
the same time, manufacturers and physicians will once again have incentive to
engage creativity and ingenuity in order to derive valuable new uses of available
drugs. Once the distribution of substantiated information is permitted, incen-
tive to establish such information is restored, as manufacturers and doctors no
longer face the unjust consequences of being prevented from beneting from
valuable discoveries.
It is argued that a problem with this schetne is that it removes in-
centive for a manufacturer to seek FDA approval for any new drug use. Although
such a result may not be unreasonable, the prediction itself is not necessarily
correct. First, it is important to recognize that the approved package insert
would necessarily include bold disclaimers as to unproven safety and ecacy
of a drug use, as well as a balance of available information pertaining to any
such half-listed drug use. This would require that the manufacturer disclose
any negative information relative to the drug. If the use were approved, how-
ever, the extent of required disclosure would be greatly reduced, permitting the
46manufacturer to withhold some of the minor irregularities arising in individ-
ual studies. In addition, approval of the use would permit the manufacturer
to actively promote the use of the drug. As a half-approved use, the required
disclosure
- 36 - would be so extensive that advertising of the use would be
eectively banned due to the costs and structural barriers posed by advertising.
Consequently, a manufacturer would have incentive to seek approval of those
drugs whose o-label uses prove to be suciently accepted and acceptable. In-
deed, manufacturers would benet from this half-label allowance. Under such a
scheme, manufacturer decisions as to which uses are to receive approval would
be preceded by substantial marketing and the anecdotal and clinical information
that arise from such marketing, allowing for more ecient decisionmaking.
If the predicted incentives are not sucient, and manufacturers are
not, in fact, encouraged to seek approval for accepted new uses of existing drugs,
the consequences need not be devastating, and in tnany ways may be positive if
not preferable to the current approval scheme. The FDA, in approving a drug,
recognizes that it is making an important decision in the face of uncertainty. A
positive decision is made only if there is sucient evidence of safety and ecacy
as established through clinical control tests, since actual response data is not
available. When a drug has signicant market experience and investigation, the
FDA clinical evidence requirement is not necessarily appropriate.
The FDCA could actually be interpreted as supporting a distinc-
tion in drug approval between those with market experience and those that had
47not yet been released for public use. The denition of new drug in FDCA Sec-
tion 201(p) provides for a drug status corresponding to the drug's recognition as
being safe and eective. The FDA currently maintains a policy that the GRAS
drug exception is not actually an exception at all, and that equivalent clinical
evidence is required for approval without regard to a drug's being generally rec-
ognized safe. Statutes are rarely interpreted in ways that render specic words
or phrases supeuous, as the FDCA has been in this instance. Consequently, it
would be entirely appropriate for the FDA to establish a policy under which a
drug could gain approval through submission of sucient market study, exactly
- 37 - the type of data that would support the half label theory
proposed above. Commissioner Kessler has indicated interest in considering the
approval of new drug uses in which the medical literature on the unlabelled
use [wouldi contain all of the data [neededi for an approval.66Action has not,
however, been taken on such a radical change in FDA policy, because the statute
as it is currently written and interpreted does not support such an approval
process.
It is too early to predict the outcome of Mr. Gingrich's crusade
against the excesses of the FDA. It is clear, however, that rigorous scrutiny and
public debate are likely to arise, and at least some change is likely to result.
The latest signals from the FDA show increased tension between proponents
of the opposing goals of drug safety and drug availability, signaling that the
FDA is soon likely to once again squarely face this issue and attempt to strike
66FDA Encouraging Supplemental NDA lings for O-Label Uses. The Pink Sheet. 54(5):8-
9. February3. 1992.
48a satisfactory balance. Hopefully the FDA will nally acknowledge that the
strong hand of government need not be utilized where private incentives and
marketplace regulation can work together to achieve an acceptable solution.
If not, the combined forces of the medical and pharmaceutical industries will
continue in their campaign to work with the government in deriving a solution
that prevents the stiing of innovation and senseless suering that results from
excessive regulatory zeal, while promoting the public safety by making available
only those drugs that are suciently safe and eective. Whichever of these is
to be the outcome, only time will tell...
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